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Is there a Metaethical Argument Against Non-natural Moral Realism? 
Jordan Walters  
 
ABSTRACT  
In this paper, I argue that Daniel Korman and Dustin Locke’s debunking argument 
against non-natural moral realism overgeneralizes to non-moral domains, and as a 
consequence, entails an implausible epistemic principle. I call this principle 
NOMO: No Modal Connection without an Explanatory Connection. I argue that 
NOMO is implausible for three reasons: (1) NOMO entails an implausible 
constraint on empirical knowledge; (2) NOMO entails rejecting any view that 
doesn’t equate “explanatory connections” with “causal connections” (which entails 
debunking non-causal realism across the board), and finally (3) NOMO is self-
undermining. I then consider two replies and argue that they both fail. As a last 
step, I argue that, even if NOMO were independently plausible, it would be 
dialectically inefficacious against its primary addressee, the non-natural moral 
realist, because the latter must regard it as question-begging. I conclude by 
elaborating the shared root of all discussed problems: Korman and Locke’s 
debunking argument isn’t about morality. That is, it is not a metaethical argument 
against non-natural moral realism—it is a more general epistemic argument against 
non-causal realism (under which non-natural moral realism falls). 
 
“Of course, some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content 
is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in 
favor of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive 
evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking”  
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§1. Introduction  
Consider the following claims:  
1. You only believe that lying is wrong because this belief enhances reproductive 
success.1 
2. Your belief that God exists is an infantile projection.2 
3. You only believe in Kripkean judgments about reference because you are a 
Westerner.3 
4. You only believe that consequentialism is false because of a chemical reaction in 
your Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex.4 
5. You only believe in the analytic/synthetic distinction because you went to Oxford.5  
Aptly characterizing the underlying structure of all of these claims, we might use the following 
phrase: “You only believe that because....[such-and-such]” (White, 2010: 573). What these sorts 
of arguments—known as debunking arguments—all share in common is that they aim to 
undermine the epistemic status of beliefs by appealing to their illegitimate origins. In their 
simplest form, debunking arguments consist of a causal premise and an epistemic premise. The 
causal premise identifies what makes it the case that, S believes that p (e.g., underlying 
psychological features). The epistemic premise asserts that the causal premise is an epistemic 
defeater for p (e.g., those underlying psychological features do not appropriately track the truth). 
Accordingly, the conclusion of a debunking argument is that S’s belief that p is unjustified.6  
Of increasing concern to contemporary moral philosophers are Evolutionary Debunking 
Arguments, which aim to undermine the epistemic status of moral beliefs (as construed by moral 
realists) by appeal to their evolutionary origins.7 The worry is that if evolutionary forces had 
shaped us differently, we would hold different beliefs now. Against this, moral realists claim that 
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moral truths don’t depend on us. Hence, so the idea goes, out of all the possible paths that 
evolutionary forces could have led us down, moral realists are committed to thinking that our 
moral beliefs and the moral facts coincide. However, that is akin to thinking that you got the 
winning lottery ticket before the numbers are even announced.8 So, if moral realism is true, then 
we are most likely isolated from the moral truths.9 The upshot, so the debunker tells us, is to 
reject moral realism.10  
And yet, although this may seem like a niche worry of contemporary metaethics, the 
concern over the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs dates back to Darwin who wrote:  
“If…men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can 
hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a 
sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile 
daughters; and no one would think of interfering” (Darwin, 1874: 73).11 
A similar stance on the genealogy of our moral, political, and religious beliefs seems to be taken 
in Marx, e.g. in The German Ideology, where he writes:  
“If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera 
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the 
inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process [...] Morality, 
religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of 
consciousness thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no 
history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their 
material intercourse, alter, along with this real existence, their thinking and the 
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products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness 
is determined by life” (Marx, 1972: 154-155). 
Nietzsche too, worried about the genealogy of moral and religious belief.12 In Human all too 
Human, he writes:  
“How [the belief in God] originated can at the present stage of comparative ethnology 
no longer admit of doubt, and with the insight into that origin the belief falls away”      
(Nietzsche 1986).13 
Furthermore, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche appears to be suspicious of philosophical 
theorizing itself. Far from being an impartial quest for truth, Nietzsche displays worries that 
philosophy is a species of motivated reasoning when he writes:  
 “It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a 
confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; 
moreover, that the moral (or immoral) intention in every philosophy have every time 
constituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown. To explain 
how a philosopher’s most remote metaphysical assertions have actually been arrived 
at, it is always well (and wise) to ask oneself first: what morality does this (does he) 
aim at?” (Nietzsche, 2003: 37). 
I could go on, but the lesson should be clear: major works in the history of philosophy and 
science from various schools defend a genealogical skepticism about moral truths. However, 
these debunking arguments are not only a matter of historical interest. On the contrary, they are 
on the rise again. From the claim of contemporary experimental philosophers that empirical data 
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about peer disagreement undermines our intuitions elicited vis-à-vis the method of cases,14 to the 
rising interest in a supposed neural basis of moral judgment,15 contemporary analytic 
philosophers are starting to take an interest in genealogical reflections on the contingency of our 
beliefs.16 Indeed, debunking arguments, as of late, have made an appearance almost everywhere: 
the domains targeted range across “causation, chance, color, consciousness, epistemic reasons, 
free will, grounding, laws of nature, logic, mathematics, modality, morality, natural kinds, 
ordinary objects, religion, and time” (Korman, 2019: 1). Debunking arguments, then, are 
ubiquitous; they exist for almost any domain. 
Notice that for most of the aforementioned debunking arguments, there is the assertion of 
a causal influence—whether it be evolutionary, historical, or psychological—on your beliefs in a 
domain D. The epistemic status of your beliefs is undermined because the causal features that 
influence and determine your beliefs are contingent. (They could have been otherwise.) Given 
this, it seems you would have to count it as a piece of luck that you ended up with true beliefs. 
However, as the debunker is quick to press, you have no good independent reason to think that 
you got lucky. What you should do, according to the debunker, is give up your beliefs (as you 
understand them). 
§1.1 Resisting the debunker  
Suppose you want to resist a debunking argument. What are you to do? Well, one way to resist a 
debunking argument is to deny the causal premise. For example, you might claim that 
evolutionary debunking arguments are founded on evolutionary psychology, which, in turn, 
relies on flimsy “just-so stories.”17 Analogously, you might deny that your moral beliefs are 
demonstrably caused by neurons firing, your historical epoch, economic superstructures, cultural 
contingency, or any other worldly features. Thus, according to this line of reasoning, you should 
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only doubt your beliefs when you are given a concrete reason to doubt that your beliefs are 
neither safe nor sensitive.18  
 Suppose that you think you are still justified in believing that p. Are you home free? 
Well, on the one hand, those debunking arguments that rely on diagnosing what makes it the case 
that you believe that p are no longer effective against you. On the other hand, a new, content-
neutral debunking argument—put forward by Korman & Locke (forthcoming)—has been crafted 
to deal with this move. As Korman and Locke see it, it is the fact that there is no explanatory 
relation between your belief that p, and the fact P, that should cause you to doubt that you are 
reliable in believing that p.19 Thus, it seems like no matter what path you take—i.e., asserting a 
causal influence or denying a causal influence—you end up with the same outcome: suspension 
of your beliefs (as you, our supposed realist, construe them). In the first case, you debunk the 
belief. In the second case, you should doubt the reliability of the belief.  
§1.2 Recasting the debate?  
So much for the general structure of debunking arguments. My point in outlining these two sorts 
of debunking arguments has been to sketch a rough picture of what motivates Korman and 
Locke’s formulation of their debunking argument, and its significance for the current state of the 
debate. At the outset of their paper, Korman and Locke say that they aim to recast the debate 
between debunkers and realists. They say that the debate has bottomed out into mutual 
accusations of “question-begging” and that the debate should instead focus on “a certain 
assumption of epistemic priority” (Korman & Locke, forthcoming: 2). That is, the debate should 
focus on whether or not justification requires an ability to explain the causes of beliefs that we 
take to be reliable. Their promise, as I take it, is that we can make progress in metaethics if we 
focus on metaepistemology.  
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 Korman and Locke (forthcoming) target their debunking argument at a view called non-
natural moral realism,20 which we might characterize as follows: 
(1) Moral facts are not natural facts (NON-NATURALISM).  
(2) Moral facts are attitude/mind-independent (REALISM).  
(3) We have a way of knowing moral facts (COGNITIVISM).  
(4) Moral facts are not necessarily causally connected to our moral beliefs (CAUSAL 
INEFFICACY).21  
Daniel Korman and Dustin Locke (forthcoming: 3) call this last point the lack of an “explanatory 
connection.” They say that a fact is explanatorily connected to a belief if there is a causal 
connection between the belief and the fact. Thus, according to Korman and Locke, it seems 
inconsistent to say that we have a way of knowing moral facts while also holding that moral facts 
are not necessarily explanatorily connected to our moral beliefs.22 Why is this so? Well, usually 
when we claim that we know a fact, we are able to give an explanation about the relationship 
between our belief and the fact. For instance, if I know that there is a cup of coffee on the table 
in the adjacent room, I can give you an explanation (involving my perceptual faculties) about 
how my belief is related to this fact: I’ve just been there and seen it. However, the non-natural 
moral realist can’t give this kind of explanation for the moral facts.  
Daniel Korman and Dustin Locke think that the presence of this reliability challenge 
poses a unique problem for the non-natural moral realist. They motivate a debunking argument 
with the conclusion that non-natural moral realists ought to suspend their moral beliefs because 
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they cannot rationally believe that their moral beliefs are reliable without being explanatorily 
connected (Korman & Locke, forthcoming). Put another way, propositions 3 and 4 are in tension.  
However, I argue that Daniel Korman and Dustin Locke’s debunking argument against 
non-natural moral realism overgeneralizes to non-moral domains and thus entails endorsing a 
very demanding and therefore ultimately implausible epistemic principle.  
Here is how I will proceed. In §2, I present Korman and Locke’s debunking argument 
against the non-natural moral realist, which I call “THE MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT.” In §3 I 
argue that their debunking argument against the non-natural moral realist overgeneralizes to non-
moral domains, thereby forcing Korman and Locke to endorse a general epistemic principle—
NOMO—that would debunk non-causal realism across the board (logic, mathematics, modality, 
etc...). In §4 I argue that NOMO is implausible, and in §5 I consider two possible replies. I argue 
that they fail. In §6, I highlight how NOMO is dialectically inefficacious against the non-natural 
moral realist. I close in §7, summing up what I have done.  
§2. Korman and Locke’s modal debunking argument  
Before we get to Korman and Locke’s debunking argument in its schematic form, let me define 
two relevant terms. 
EXPLANATORY CONNECTION: A belief is explanatorily connected to a fact “iff it is 
[causally] explained by or explains some facts in [a domain] D” (Korman & Locke, 
forthcoming: 3). 
MODAL CONNECTION: A belief is modally connected to a fact “iff it bears an 
epistemically significant counterfactual relation to some facts in [a domain] D” 
(Korman & Locke, forthcoming: 3) 
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What does it mean to explain a belief by a fact? Well, suppose your roommate is setting the table 
for breakfast. You come to have the belief that there is a cup of coffee on the table. Let’s call 
your belief a “cup-belief.” Now, suppose someone asks you why you believe that there is a cup 
of coffee on the table. You can explain why (e.g., via perception) you have your cup-belief by the 
fact that there is a cup on the table. Put differently, you can say that your cup-belief in this case is 
explanatorily connected to the cup-fact because it is explained by the fact to which it is 
connected, namely the fact that there is a cup on the table. Of course, the justification of your 
cup-belief can be via direct perception; but it could also be indirect justification, via testimony. 
The key point to note here is that your ability to give an explanation—either directly or 
indirectly—coupled with a reliable tracking mechanism, entitles you to your cup-belief.  
Now, what does it mean to say that a belief bears “an epistemically significant 
counterfactual relation” to the facts (Korman & Locke, forthcoming: 3)? Well, suppose that 
you’ve finished your coffee, and there is now a bowl of cereal on the table—but you still have 
your cup-belief. If this is so, then it seems that you continue to hold your cup-belief when there is 
in fact a bowl on the table. In this case, we can say that your cup-belief isn’t modally connected 
to the cup-fact because you still have your cup-belief regardless of whether or not there are any 
cup-facts. If in all possible worlds you still end up with cup-beliefs—even when there is a bowl 
of cereal on the table—then your cup-belief forming methods are unreliable. For your cup-belief 
to be modally connected would require you only having it when there are cups on the table. Once 
your coffee is finished and you’ve moved on to the cereal, you should move onto bowl-beliefs.  
At this point, it is important to recognize that Korman and Locke, as I understand them, 
assume that modal connections just are causal connections, which as a consequence, stipulates a 
counterfactual theory of causation with respect to their definitions. There is, however, 
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considerable debate over this assumption.23 I do not have the space to deal with this issue here, 
but in what follows it will become clear that the force of their argument turns, in part, on this 
assumption. We are now in a position to turn to the debunking argument in its schematic form. 
Here is my formulation of Korman and Locke’s (forthcoming: 3) debunking argument, which I 
call:  
MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT 
(P1) According to non-natural moral realists, moral facts are not necessarily causally 
connected to our moral beliefs (CAUSAL INEFFICACY). 
(P2) If one is rationally committed to believing that one’s moral beliefs are not 
explanatorily connected to the moral facts, then one is rationally committed to 
believing that one’s moral beliefs are not modally connected.  
(P3) If one is rationally committed to believing that one’s moral beliefs are not 
modally connected, then one is rationally committed to withholding from one’s 
moral beliefs.  
(C) So, non-natural moral realists are rationally committed to withholding from moral 
beliefs.24  
 
The tension that Korman and Locke highlight with Premise 2 is that the non-natural moral realist 
seems to be inconsistent in holding that moral facts are not necessarily explanatorily connected 
to our beliefs (CAUSAL INEFFICACY) while also claiming that they have a way of knowing these 
moral facts (COGNITIVISM). Why is this so? Well, just as it seems epistemically problematic that 
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your cup-beliefs could reliably track cups on the table, absent of an explanatory connection, so 
too does it seem epistemically problematic that your moral beliefs could reliably track mind-
independent moral facts, absent of an explanatory connection. No doubt, this is not an isolated 
worry. Indeed, the thrust behind Premise 2 shares similarities with familiar worries over 
Substance Dualism (e.g., the problem of explaining how an immaterial substance could interact 
with an extended substance—and vice versa) and Theism (e.g., the problem of explaining how a 
finite and contingent mind could come to grasp and have a clear and distinct idea of an infinite 
and necessary being).   
Of course, when met with this kind of charge, the non-natural moral realist sees nothing 
wrong with asserting—in Moorean fashion—that these beliefs are in no need of explanation; for 
they seem as true as anything, and more “credible than any philosopher’s argument to the 
contrary” (Schaffer, 2009: 357). Indeed, the non-natural moral realist will concede that they 
aren’t indefeasible. To be sure, there is, in principle, something that could undermine these basic 
beliefs. By the non-natural moral realist lights, an epistemic defeater is some information that 
gives them a positive reason to doubt that their belief forming methods are reliable.  
Nevertheless, by Korman and Locke’s lights, in conceding that their moral beliefs aren’t 
explanatorily connected, the non-natural moral realist has already started digging their own 
grave. For Korman and Locke’s MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT aims to show that a lack of an 
explanation gives the non-natural moral realist a reason to think that their moral beliefs are 
neither safe nor sensitive. The basic idea here is that not being able to tell a story about how your 
moral beliefs are explained by moral facts (on the realist’s construal of them) gives you some 
reason to believe that the methods that you used to acquire your moral beliefs are unreliable; and 
we shouldn’t trust beliefs that are acquired from an unreliable mechanism.  
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In sum, then, Korman and Locke’s MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT challenges the non-
natural moral realist to either accept that (i) they are beneficiaries of a pre-established harmony 
of sorts25 or to (ii) give a reason for why they should think that they got lucky.  Both of these 
options seem untenable. Of course, they could give up proposition 4 and offer a naturalistic 
account of how moral facts supervene on—or are reducible to—natural facts. However, if they 
did this, then they wouldn’t be non-natural moral realists, and the MODAL DEBUNKING 
ARGUMENT only applies to non-natural moral realists. Hence, the challenge remains.  
§3. Overgeneralizing and NOMO 
In this section, I’m going to argue that the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT generalizes to non-
moral domains of thought, thereby committing Korman and Locke to endorsing a general 
epistemic principle that I call NOMO.26 An upshot of endorsing NOMO is that it rules out all 
forms of non-causal realism. Following Jared Warren, I will define non-causal realism about X 
as the position which hold that X-truths are (i) mind-independent, (ii) non-trivial, (iii) truth-apt, 
and (iv) causally inert  (Warren, 2017: 1654).27 For any belief that has properties i—iv let’s say it 
has feature . Perhaps the most familiar concept possessing feature  is God (Warren, 2017: 
1660). Consider: God is said to be (i) mind independent and (ii) truths about the nature of God 
are allegedly non-trivial. Moreover, (iii) sentences involving God have truth-conditions and are 
objects of thought. Finally, (iv) God is outside of space and time—i.e., not of this contingent 
world. Let me begin with my overgeneralization argument in its schematic form:  
OVERGENERALIZATION ARGUMENT 
(O1)  If the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT generalizes to non-moral domains, then it 
entails the general epistemic principle NOMO. 
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(O2) The MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT generalizes to non-moral domains. 
(C) Therefore, the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT entails NOMO. 
Consider the first premise of my overgeneralization argument: Why should you think that the 
MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT generalizes to non-moral domains? Well, Korman and Locke 
do not provide an argument as to why the problem that they raise for the non-natural moral 
realist should be specific to the content of moral beliefs. Hence, the non-natural moral realist 
could say:  
 I hold a large class of my beliefs—aesthetic, mathematical, and philosophical—to 
be reliable and true without having what you understand as an explanatory 
connection for them.28 So why should I think that there is something peculiar 
about my moral beliefs? You haven’t given me any information to undermine the 
reliability of my moral beliefs—you have merely pointed out that they share a 
characteristic feature, , with my aesthetic, mathematical, and philosophical 
beliefs.  
Thus, if Korman and Locke’s argument to the non-natural moral realist amounts to saying that,  
 Descriptive claim. Your moral beliefs have some feature , that some of your other 
beliefs lack (viz. beliefs about empirical facts). 
 
then the non-natural moral realist can easily accommodate that without doubting the reliability of 
their moral beliefs. Hence, it’s clear that the strength of Korman and Locke’s argument can’t turn 
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on the mere descriptive claim that moral beliefs share similarities with other beliefs. It must turn 
on some further claim that feature  gives you reason to suspend the belief: 
 Normative claim. Your moral beliefs have some feature  that gives you reason to 
suspend your moral beliefs. 
This, however, would apply to any belief that has feature . Since the MODAL DEBUNKING 
ARGUMENT only holds if you accept the stronger normative claim as opposed to the weaker 
descriptive claim then, I think it’s fair to say that we can keep the logical form of Korman and 
Locke’s argument and swap out ‘moral beliefs’ for any other belief for which realists cannot give 
an explanatory connection story. Reconstructing and generalizing their argument, yields the 
following:  
MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT* 
 (P1*) Non-causal realists are rationally committed to believing that their -beliefs are 
not causally connected to the facts. 
(P2*) If one is rationally committed to believing that one’s -beliefs are not 
explanatorily connected to the facts, then one is rationally committed to believing 
that one’s -beliefs are not modally connected.  
(P3*) If one is rationally committed to believing that one’s -beliefs are not modally 
connected, then one is rationally committed to withholding from one’s -beliefs.  
(C*) So, non-causal realists are rationally committed to withholding from -beliefs. 
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Take a close look at premise P2*. All that has changed is that ‘moral beliefs’ have been swapped 
for ‘-beliefs.’ Korman and Locke now appear to be endorsing, via P2*, the following general 
epistemic principle that I call the No Modal Connection without an Explanatory Connection 
(NOMO) for all domains:  
NOMO: For any belief P that S has, it is rational for S to think that P is modally 
connected to a mind-independent fact , if and only if S can give a causal 
explanation involving the relation between P and . 
NOMO is essentially a negative principle: it says that you can have all the mind-independence, 
truth-aptness, and reliability that you want. However, there is a catch: NOMO says that if you 
add in (iv) causal inertness you must rationally commit to withholding -beliefs. To see how 
NOMO connects back with our metaethical case, recall the commitments of the non-natural 
moral realist:  
(1) Moral facts are not natural facts (NON-NATURALISM). 
(2) Moral facts are attitude/mind-independent (REALISM).  
(3) We have a way of knowing moral facts (COGNITIVISM). 
(4) Moral facts are not necessarily causally connected to our moral beliefs (CAUSAL 
INEFFICACY).  
Here’s the dialectic: According to NOMO, these four propositions cannot all be true. Let’s take 
proposition 1 as a core commitment of the non-natural moral realist. On the one hand, NOMO 
says that you can hold propositions 2 and 4, in which case you posit the existence of moral facts 
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in tandem with an explanatory gap. However, NOMO dictates that you up proposition 3, i.e., you 
give up the possibility of moral knowledge (as the non-natural moral realist construes it).29 On 
the other hand, NOMO says that you can hold propositions 2 and 3, in which case moral facts are 
mind-independent and we have a way of knowing them—just like facts about cups of coffee. 
However, in giving up on proposition 4 you end up claiming that moral facts explain or are 
explained by natural facts, thereby giving up proposition 1.30 So, no matter how you carve up the 
terrain, NOMO says that it’s inconsistent to hold propositions 1-4 together. 
Let’s take stock. What I have shown thus far is that the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT 
generalizes, and that it entails endorsing a general epistemic principle—NOMO—that debunks 
non-causal realism across the board. In what follows, I will give three reasons to doubt NOMO 
(§4) and then, in §5, I will consider two objections. 
§4. The implausibility of NOMO 
In this section I will argue that NOMO, as a constraint on what it is rational to believe, is 
implausible for three reasons.  
§4.1 Trouble in the empirical domain  
First, there seem to be many facts we can reliably know but couldn’t if NOMO were true. For 
example, consider the mundane claim that we are reliable about at least some facts about the 
future. It seems uncontroversial that I know that I will be dead in a million years. It is prima 
facie rational to believe this. However, my present belief that I will be dead in a million years is 
in no way caused by the future fact that I will be dead in a million years. Nevertheless, I still 
seem rationally entitled to this belief.31 It seems rational to claim that I know it, on pain of what I 
would commit myself to (via an epistemic closure principle) if I claimed that I lacked knowledge 
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about this future fact.32 However, NOMO says that I can’t have knowledge of some fact , 
without being able to give an explanatory connection for , which seems too stringent of a 
constraint, even for this case of empirical knowledge. It might be a tenable constraint on some 
forms of empirical knowledge; but as a general epistemic principle, it seems to demand too 
much. 
§4.2 Trouble in non-empirical domains  
Second, NOMO seems implausible for non-empirical claims because it seems like a category 
mistake to demand a causal connection for non-empirical domains. Accordingly, you might 
worry that NOMO entails rejecting forms of non-causal realism that seem independently 
plausible. Indeed, as Jared Warren notes, Fine (2001), Parfit (2011), Nagel (1986), Lewis (1984) 
and Sider (2011) “seem to endorse non-causal realism about mathematics, logic, ethics, and other 
domains as well” (Warren, 2017: 1654). No doubt, then, the non-natural moral realist might—
reasoning abductively—claim that NOMO is too demanding of an epistemic principle to adopt. 
The idea here is that endorsing NOMO requires giving up any belief that lacks a causal 
connection. Yet, presumably, not all beliefs require explanation: e.g., every explanation has to 
stop somewhere; asking for a further explanation where there is none might be an epistemic vice, 
rather than a virtue, in this context. Of course, one can always bite the bullet: it could be that we 
ought to give up non-causal realism across the board, upon considering NOMO. Nevertheless, 
insofar as Korman and Locke have only given an argument for NOMO in the moral domain, it 




§4.3 Trouble with self -defeat 
Third, NOMO seems implausible because it suffers a problem of self-defeat. Consider: NOMO 
says that I can’t have knowledge of some fact , without being in a place to give an explanatory 
connection for . Let’s say I’m unconvinced. Suppose I ask: Why should I believe in the truth of 
NOMO if I don’t have an explanatory connection for the relationship between (i) my belief that 
NOMO is true and (ii) the fact that NOMO is true? It doesn’t seem like NOMO permits us to 
have knowledge of its own truth because we aren’t in a position to know (i) that our belief that 
NOMO is true is modally connected to (ii) the fact that NOMO is true.34 Thus, NOMO seems to 
suffer an analogous problem of self-defeat that buried the verification theory of meaning: just as 
the verification principle cannot be verified, so too can NOMO—as a normative epistemic 
principle—not be evaluated by its own standards; for NOMO cannot be said to enter into causal 
relationships with our beliefs.  
I have just given three reasons for thinking that NOMO, taken as a general epistemic 
principle governing what is rational to believe, is too demanding. I furthermore argued that 
Korman and Locke’s MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT entails NOMO. I hence conclude that we 
should reject the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT. 
In the next section, I consider two possible replies for the debunker, dealing with (i) the 
problem of self-refutation and (ii), the problem that NOMO undermines many tenable beliefs in 
non-moral domains of thought.   
§5. A way out for the debunker?  
Korman attempts to offer a reply to the counterexamples I raised in §4. He attempts to escape the 
worry of self-refutation by adopting an anti-realist construal of epistemic facts, and he attempts 
to escape the overgeneralization worry by modifying NOMO itself. However, I think that both of 
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these replies amount to ad hoc patches that fail to address the deeper problem; namely, that the 
only way to save NOMO involves adopting an epistemology according to which there is no 
absolute truth in any domain and hence, trivially, no truth with respect to the questions under 
discussion. 
§5.1 A way out of self -refutation? 
Korman (2019) acknowledges my point that the epistemic premise (P2) in the MODAL 
DEBUNKING ARGUMENT is underwritten by “a more general explanatory constraint” (i.e., NOMO) 
that suffers the problem of self-defeat; that is, he takes my point that the debunker cannot draw 
the conclusion that NOMO is true without undermining NOMO itself.35 However, he claims that 
this does not show that NOMO is false or that “no one can rationally accept” its truth (Korman, 
2019: 8). Instead, he claims that it is open for anti-realists to launch a conditional debunking 
argument against non-natural moral realism “so long as they are willing to extend their anti-
realism to epistemic facts” like NOMO (Korman, 2019: 8).   
Recall that NOMO is a general constraint on what is rational to believe. It is not a 
hypothetical principle that would only apply to some agents just in case they have the relevant 
set of attitudes; rather, it is a categorical principle that is supposed to apply to all agents 
irrespective of their current set of attitudes. Given this, I do not think that adopting an anti-realist 
construal of epistemic facts is useful in the context of this debate because such a move trivially 
makes it the case that the self-undermining objection dissolves by trading in a categorical 
principle for a hypothetical one.  
In addition, Korman’s reply is dialectically inefficacious: we cannot assume that non-
natural moral realists are anti-realist’s about epistemic facts. Thus, given that the force of their 
argument now hinges on anti-realism about epistemic facts, it follows that NOMO is just a report 
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about what follows from what—i.e., what claims about epistemic facts you should make if you 
find yourself endorsing the debunkers epistemic system X.  
My general point here is that the debunker only gets to use NOMO as a premise in their 
debunking argument in virtue of it being categorical. Yet, crucially, and by definition, once we 
adopt an anti-realist construal of epistemic facts, NOMO cannot be categorical. Ultimately, then, 
it seems that the debunkers move of extending “their anti-realism to epistemic facts” like NOMO 
has not done them any good in this context (Korman, 2019: 8). I am willing to grant Korman’s 
point that the apparent self-undermining feature of NOMO does not show that it is false or that 
“no one can rationally accept” it (Korman, 2019: 8). Perhaps epistemic anti-realists can accept it; 
but the mere acceptance of an epistemic principle does not entail its truth. Thus, I take it that 
either NOMO is still self-refuting or a hypothetical claim about what the debunker thinks they 
should believe.  
§5.2 A way out of  overgeneralization? 
Another objection to NOMO was that it undermines many tenable beliefs in non-moral domains 
of thought (e.g., inductive beliefs or independently plausible forms of non-causal realism). 
Daniel Korman (2019) anticipates this worry. He claims that the debunker might attempt to 
weaken NOMO to “make room for justified beliefs about the future” (Korman, 2019: 8). He 
gives us such a proposal (which, for the purposes of this paper, I will call NOMO*): 
NOMO* “If S believes that the fact that p neither explains nor is explained by her 
belief that p and that there is no further fact that explains both the fact that p and 
the belief that p, then S is thereby rationally committed to withholding from 
believing p” (Korman, 2019: 8). 
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NOMO* is designed to get around some of the worries that I outlined earlier. For instance, 
Korman writes, “Supposing that the laws of nature figure in the explanation of both facts about 
future sunrises and our beliefs about them, . . . [NOMO*] . . . will not prescribe withholding 
belief about future sunrises” (Korman, 2019: 8). Such an argument might go as follows: 
(A1) S believes that the fact that there will be a future sunrise neither explains nor 
is explained by her belief that there will be a future sunrise (~EXPLANATORY 
CONNECTION). 
(A2) There is some further fact—laws of nature—that explains both the fact that 
there will be a future sunrise and the belief that there will be a future sunrise 
(THIRD FACTOR).  
(C) Therefore, S is thereby rationally entitled to believing that there will be a 
future sunrise.  
Premise A2 seems too quick. Do the same laws of nature (whatever they might be, if there are 
any) that cause the sun to go up correspondingly cause my belief that the sun will go up? That 
seems dubious and presupposes a whole suite of philosophical commitments.36 Even if we 
suppose that laws of nature constitutively figure into an explanation of why I believe that the sun 
will rise tomorrow, we might ask, in Humean spirit: How are we entitled to believing that (i) 
laws of nature as opposed to (ii) a mere association of ideas, is what figures into our explanation 
for why we believe that there will be future sunrises? We can’t merely assert that our belief that 
there are laws of nature explains or is explained by the fact that there are laws of nature; for our 
belief that there are laws of nature could be given an alternative explanation, according to which 
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our belief that there are laws of nature is explained by the fact that we observe a constant 
conjunction of ideas. 
 Suppose we grant that NOMO* avoids the problem of undermining many tenable beliefs 
in non-moral domains of thought (e.g., inductive beliefs or tenable forms of non-causal realism). 
Even still, I think that, despite the modification, NOMO* also suffers a problem of self-defeat.  
To see this, just ask yourself: Does the epistemic fact expressed by NOMO* explain your 
belief that NOMO* is true? Note that we have already ruled out the option that there is a direct 
explanatory connection for the relationship between your belief that NOMO is true and the fact 
that NOMO is true. That is what motivated modifying NOMO to NOMO*. Accordingly, then, 
the only option on the table is to tell some story about how there might be some further fact that 
explains your belief that NOMO* is true and the fact that NOMO* is true. Let us call this further 
fact “FF”. What might FF be? We need to lay some constraints on the table.37     
(A) FF must be modally connected; that is, we would need to know whether or not we 
would still have believed that ff if FF did not hold.  
(B) FF must justify the belief that NOMO* is true.  
(C) FF must explain the belief that NOMO* is true and the fact that NOMO* is true. 
We are now confronted with a puzzle: proposition A says that we need to know whether or not 
we are reliable in believing FF. How might we do this? Well, according to Korman and Locke, 
the only way to test this is to give some sort of causal story concerning the relationship between 
our beliefs and the facts, which is what proposition C requires. However, by their own definition, 
such an explanation is off the table for abstract normative facts (which are causally inefficacious) 
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that figure into justifying beliefs.38 Thus, whatever FF turns out to be, it cannot satisfy 
proposition B. This means that no further fact—whatever it might be—can justify believing that 
NOMO* is true. Thus, NOMO* is also self-undermining.39  
Let me now turn to my subsequent point that even if we had some way of knowing 
whether or not NOMO (or NOMO*) were true, it would still be dialectically inefficacious 
against the non-natural moral realist to endorse such a principle in argument.  
§6. Is NOMO dialectically inefficacious?  
I have just given three reasons for why you might think that NOMO is implausible. I also tried to 
defend the implausibility of NOMO against two objections. Let us suppose you are not 
convinced.  There is still a further problem, namely, that even if NOMO should be true, Korman 
and Locke’s MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT would be dialectically inefficacious against their 
primary target, the non-natural moral realist.  
Recall that the non-natural moral realist is committed to the irreducibility of the normative 
to the non-normative, all the while holding that our moral beliefs are reliable. Ronald Dworkin 
best articulates this: 
Consider Gilbert Harman’s suggestion that we cannot regard any belief as reliable 
unless we think that the best causal explanation of why we hold it refers to the state of 
affairs it describes. In some form, this test does seem appropriate to beliefs about the 
physical world. [...] But nothing in the content of moral (or aesthetic or mathematical 
or philosophical) opinions invites or justifies such a test. On the contrary, the content 
of these domains excludes it, because an adequate causal explanation of a belief 
includes showing that the belief would not have occurred if the alleged cause had not 
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been present, and we cannot understand or test that counterfactual claim with respect 
to moral or aesthetic beliefs because we cannot imagine a world that is exactly like this 
one except that in that world slavery is just or The Marriage of Figaro is trash 
(Dworkin, 1996: 119).  
The big difference between the moral (or aesthetic or mathematical or philosophical) domain and 
the empirical domain, as Dworkin sees it, is that the moral domain just seems to require different 
“standards for reliable belief” (Dworkin, 1996: 119). On Dworkin’s view, since the standards for 
the moral domain are different than the natural domain, there is nothing metaphysically odd or 
queer with holding that we have a way of knowing moral facts while also holding that moral 
facts are not necessarily explanatorily connected to our moral beliefs. Let’s call this view 
Reliability Standard Pluralism:  
RELIABILITY STANDARD PLURALISM (RSP). The standard for the modal reliability of a 
proposition P turns on facts about the domain to which P belongs.  
RSP can be contrasted with what NOMO seems to require, which I’ll call Reliability Standard 
Monism: 
RELIABILITY STANDARD MONISM (RSM). The standard for the modal reliability of a 
proposition P turns on facts about whether or not S can give a causal explanation 
involving the relation between P and the truth-maker for P.  
Here’s why NOMO appears to be dialectically inefficacious. Since Dworkin endorses RSP, when 
Korman and Locke call into question his moral beliefs on the grounds that they are unreliable, 
Dworkin will claim that the moral domain requires different “standards for reliable belief” 
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(Dworkin, 1996: 119), thereby retaining justification in his moral beliefs. At this point, Korman 
and Locke can accuse Dworkin of question-begging because he appears to be appealing to his 
“moral beliefs [...] to vindicate the very faculties that are responsible for those beliefs” (Korman 
& Locke, forthcoming: 8).40 To this, Dworkin could reply by asserting that his moral beliefs are 
just as reliable as his aesthetic or mathematical or philosophical beliefs. Following this, Korman 
and Locke seem to have only one option left: they have to reject RSP, and thus, argue for a more 
general epistemic principle—NOMO—that undermines reliability in all of the domains that 
Dworkin mentioned. However, at this point in the dialectic, Dworkin (and non-natural moral 
realists) can contend that NOMO proves too much: (i) NOMO appears to rule out knowledge of 
future facts; (ii) NOMO undermines non-causal realism across the board; (iii) and finally, 
NOMO appears to be self-defeating. And without independent arguments for each of these 
worries, the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT appears to be dialectically inefficacious. 
And yet, recall that the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT was built to be dialectically 
efficacious; it was built with the intention that it would move forward a somewhat stagnant 
debate. Indeed, at the outset of their paper, Korman and Locke say that the debate has bottomed 
out into mutual accusations of “question-begging” and that the debate should instead focus on “a 
certain assumption of epistemic priority” (Korman & Locke, forthcoming: 2). That is, the debate 
should focus on whether or not justification requires an ability to explain the causes of beliefs 
that we take to be reliable  
However, in reorienting the debate over to a debate about “a certain assumption of 
epistemic priority”, Dworkin seems within his right to claim that Korman and Locke are begging 
the question: They do not provide an argument against one of Dworkin’s basic tenets (RSP); by 
defining reliability as they do, they start from the assumption that this tenet is incorrect. It hardly 
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comes as a surprise, then, that if we start off assuming that RSM is right, we get to make a 
debunking argument in the moral domain. Ultimately, it seems like more work is needed on 
Korman and Locke’s part to independently motivate NOMO before the MODAL DEBUNKING 
ARGUMENT can be used against non-natural moral realists.  
§7. Conclusion  
Ultimately, whether or not the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT succeeds is still an open 
question. I have not answered that question in this paper. However, one thing remains clear: If 
the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT succeeds, the reasons why it succeeds are instructive; for 
the reasons why this type of argument succeeds—if it does—turns out to hinge on a battery of 
philosophical commitments outside of ethics. My argument adds to the doubts regarding the 
possibility of a pure metaethical debunking-styled argument that targets only the second-order 
status of moral claims. From what I have argued here, the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT turns 
out to be just another instance of an epistemic argument that targets the knowability of 
CAUSALLY INEFFICACIOUS facts.  
My larger point is that, in order to get clear over the debate between so-called debunkers 
and realists in metaethics, we need to solve the long-standing epistemic puzzle of whether or not 
we are justified in believing that we have knowledge of causally inefficacious facts. The worry 
that we cannot know anything about causally inefficacious facts is as old as philosophy itself. 
(Frege’s third realm and Plato’s heaven, for example, have always struck some as dubious.) 
What that means, for the metaethical debate under discussion, I believe, is that it is not resolved 
by doing more metaethics. Metaethics, at least for this debate, must be put to the side, and 
epistemology must take its place. This is because the problem at the heart of the moral reliability 
challenge, as it turns out, isn’t about morality at all.41    
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Endnotes   
1 See Joyce (2013: 356) for the argument that it is simply an “adaptive pay-off” that we believe 
such.  
2 Following Freud, you might worry that belief in God is a simply your early childhood 
manifestation of a “longing for [a] father” (Freud, 1927: 18) 
3 See Machery (2017: §2) for empirical data suggesting that there is significant cultural variation 
amongst speakers who make descriptivist judgments about reference and speakers who make 
causal historicist judgments about reference. Of course, very few non-philosophers actually know 
Kripke’s theory of reference, but the experiments discussed in Machery’s  (2017: §2) book tend 
to reveal that persons born into a Western culture are more likely to make causal historicist 
judgments about reference—i.e., they are natural born Kripkeans—and persons born into non-
Western cultures are more likely to make descriptivist judgments about reference.  
4 See Greene (2014: 702-718). Greene’s worry is that characteristically deontological judgments, 
made with reference to footbridge-like cases (i.e., when participants are asked whether they 
would push the man off the bridge to save the five) correlate with “Amygdala activity [which] 
correlates positively with negative emotion in response to footbridge-like cases and correlates 
negatively with consequentialist judgments” (Greene 2014: 702). From this, Greene’s worry 
seems to be that high amygdala activity indicates that people aren’t “actually engaged in moral 
reasoning” [when they respond philosophical cases, but instead, are using their reasoning to] 
“justify and organize their pre-existing conclusions about what’s right and wrong” (Greene 2014: 
718). The upshot of this, for Greene, is that consequentialist judgments engage the Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal Cortex—which is the rational part of the brain—and therefore, are more justified than 
deontological judgments that engage the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex. For an updated 
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overview, see Demaree-Cotton & Kahane (2018) for discussion of the supposed relevance of 
cognitive science to moral epistemology.  
5 See Vavova (2018: 143) for this example, which illustrates a worry that G. A. Cohen had once 
it was revealed to him that, had he studied at Harvard as opposed to Oxford, he would have taken 
the Quinean position on the analytic/synthetic distinction.  
6 Here I follow Kahane (2011: 106) in my outline of the general structure of debunking 
arguments.  
7 See Vavova (2015: 104) for an overview.  
8 The lottery ticket case is drawn from Street (2016: 20). 
9 See Street (2006: 115). 
10 See Joyce (2006) Street (2006) for influential formulations.  
11 As cited in Hopster (2018: 10). 
12 In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes that “[...] as a 13-year-old boy I was already 
preoccupied with the problem of the origin of evil” (Nietzsche, 2008: 4).  
13 As cited in Kahane (2011: 108).  
14 See Machery (2017). 
15 See Greene & Cohen (2004); Greene (2014; 2015; 2017); Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley & Cohen (2001); Kahane et al. (2012) and Kumar & Campbell (2012). 
16 See Srinivasan (2015: 325-327) for an extensive historical overview.  
17 Shafer-Landau writes: “The evolutionary account is in many ways a just-so story: We have the 
data here, in the form of our moral beliefs and dispositions, and are trying to infer a literally 
prehistoric causal story on this basis. The claim of widespread evolutionary influence (of a 
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doxastically discriminating kind) is not, on its face, implausible. But we should not pretend that 
it is free of speculation, either” (Shafer-Landau, 2012: 7, fn.6).  
18 There is some debate over how one should understand what are known as Safety and 
Sensitivity conditions on knowledge. For my purposes here, I follow Clarke-Doane and Baras’ 
formulation: “Sensitivity: Our belief that P is sensitive iff had it been that ¬P, we would not still 
have believed that P, had we used the method that we actually used to determine whether P. 
Safety: Our belief that P is safe iff we could not have easily had a false belief as to whether or 
not P, using the method that we actually used to determine whether or not P” (Clarke-Doane & 
Baras 2019: 2). I would also like to note here that Clarke-Doane and Baras construe this basic 
thought as an epistemic principle: “Modal Security: If evidence, E, undermines our belief that P, 
then E gives us reason to doubt that our belief is sensitive or safe” (Clarke-Doane & Baras 2019: 
1). 
19 See Daniel Korman and Dustin Locke (forthcoming: 3). 
20 See Shafer-Landau (2012: 1) for claims (1—3) and Lutz (forthcoming: 8) for claim 4. For the 
purposes of this paper I’ll call the following commitments and other numbered claims that follow 
them “propositions” or sometimes “Premises” to mention a claim embedded into an argument.  
21 I.e., there is not always a causal connection between the belief and the fact. Korman and Locke 
(forthcoming) call those who endorse proposition 1—4 “‘minimalists’.” I’ll take “‘minimalists’” 
to be synonymous with “‘non-natural moral realist’” for this paper. The following are 
representative: Nozick (1981: 342-348), Dworkin (1996: 117-126), Enoch (2010: §§3-5), Enoch 
(2011: §7.4), White (2010: 558-589), Wielenberg (2010: §§4-8), Parfit (2011: 532-533), Clarke-
Doane (2015: §§4-6), Berker (2014), and Vavova (2015) as cited in Korman and Locke 
(forthcoming: 1).  
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22 Of course, they are not the first to raise this general worry. Benacerraf (1973) raised it for 
mathematical Platonists. And as far as I can tell, Korman and Locke’s argument is a version of 
Benacerraf's (1973) worry applied to moral facts.  
23 See Menzies (2017: §§3.1-3.4) for the various issues that counterfactual theories of causation 
face. 
24 See Korman & Locke (forthcoming: 3). I do not quote Korman and Locke verbatim because 
they specify “realists” or where I specify “non-natural moral realists” because, by my lights, 
naturalistic versions of moral realism although they face their own set of problems, do not suffer 
from this problem of lacking an explanatory connection.  
25 Enoch (2010: 413) bites the bullet on the (godless) pre-established harmony explanation. See 
Bedke (2014: 114) for criticism of pre-established harmony explanations.  
26 Of course. charges of overgeneralizing are hardly a new feature of metaethical debates. 
Rowland (2015: 161) has argued against moral error theory on the grounds that it entails 
endorsing epistemic error theory. See Clarke-Doane (2012) and Shafer-Landau (2012) for 
analogous charges of overgeneralization against evolutionary debunking arguments.  
27 I should note that i—iv are almost identically correspond to propositions 1—4 that I laid out in 
§1. However, in keeping with Warren’s terminology, I opt to use his definitions. Non-causal 
realists across a variety of domains often face so-called ‘reliability challenges’—challenges to 
explain the relationship between their beliefs and the causally inefficacious mind-independent 
facts. These sorts of ‘reliability challenges’ (or sometimes called Benacerraf-Field challenges) 
made explicit by Clarke‐Doane (2016), have cropped up all the way from domains of modality 
(Stalnaker, 1996: 39-40) to logical domains (Schechter, 2014: 1).  
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28 Consider Dworkin (1996: 119), who holds that we cannot test counterfactual claims about 
aesthetic, mathematical, or philosophical beliefs—all the while, still maintaining that those 
beliefs are safe, sensitive, and reliable. 
29 This might be followed by quasi-realism, such as in Blackburn (1993), anti-realist 
constructivism, such as in Street (2010), or moral error theory, such as in Joyce (2006). 
30 This might be followed by naturalistic construal’s of moral realism, such as Foot (2001), or by 
some kind of commitment to a supervenience thesis, such as in Jackson & Pettit (1996). 
31 See Lutz (forthcoming: 6). 
32 Cf. Kelly & McGrath (2017: 326).  
33 See Warren (2017: 1656) for a defence of this claim.  
34 Of course, this is a version of a liar’s paradox scenario. Donaldson & Lepore (2012: 130) point 
out that some philosophers posit context-sensitivity as a means of solving liar’s paradox 
scenarios. But this option doesn’t seem open to Korman and Locke because if they claim that the 
status of NOMO changes relative to a context C, then the non-natural moral realist can claim that 
NOMO doesn’t hold in the moral domain. Of course, Korman and Locke could provide an 
argument to restrict the scope of NOMO. But such an argument is not yet on the table.  
35 I have identified the explanatory constraint that underwrites the second epistemic premise of 
the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT as NOMO. In §5.2 of Korman's (2019: 7-8) paper 
“Debunking Arguments,” he cites an epistemic principle, that is, in my view, similar enough to 
NOMO to speak of them interchangeably. His epistemic principle is: “(C2) If S believes that the 
fact that p neither explains nor is explained by her belief that p, then S is thereby rationally 
committed to withholding from believing p” (Korman, 2019: 7). Thus, for the purposes of this 
paper, I will take it that when Korman refers to “C2” he is speaking of what I call NOMO.  
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36 Korman seems to think that what causes my belief ‘that p’ also causes p (either directly or 
indirectly). But this commits him to thinking that mental states just are physical states. But there 
is plenty of good reason to think that token identity doesn’t hold between the mental and the 
physical, e.g., qualia.  
37 Each of these three constraints correspond with what the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT is 
predicated on: A is a reliability constraint; B is a justificatory constraint which is jointly satisfied 
by A & C; and finally, C is an explanatory constraint. Thus, whatever FF might be, it would need 
to be consistent with A-C.  
38 Korman writes: “[NOMO] looks to be precisely the sort of abstract normative fact that [. . .] 
doesn’t or can’t explain our beliefs” (Korman, 2019: 8). 
39 We might opt for eliminating either A or C in this case. But if the lack of an explanatory 
connection here is alright, then why not elsewhere? If lacking a modal connection here is alright, 
then why not elsewhere? Put differently, eliminating either A or C as constraints on FF would 
amount to undermining the MODAL DEBUNKING ARGUMENT’S second and third premises, 
respectively.  
40 C.f. Lutz (forthcoming: 3). 
41 It is no accident, then, that reading the latter half of this paper, one gets the feeling that they 
are reading a paper that has almost nothing to do with morality and everything to do with 
epistemology. A librarian could accidentally shelve it under the epistemology section, and we 
would hardly notice. This is because the surface-level content of the question, “How do we know 
anything at all about moral facts?” misleads us: the real question underneath it is: “How could 
our mind possibly grasp truths that are causally inefficacious?”  
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